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Abstract 
 
Key management in multicast dynamic groups, where users can leave or join 
at their ease is one of the most crucial and essential part of secure 
communication. Various efficient management strategies have been proposed 
during last decade that aim to decrease encryption costs and transmission 
overheads. In this report, two different types of key management schemes are 
proposed. First proposed scheme is based on One-way function tree (OFT). 
The proposed scheme fulfills the security gaps that have been pointed out in 
recent years. Second proposed scheme is based on logical key hierarchy 
(LKH). This proposed scheme provides better performance for, rather 
inflexible and expensive, LKH scheme.    
 
Keywords: Group communication, key management (KM), logical key 
hierarchy (LKH), one-way function tree (OFT)  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
With increasing communication services, users are often grouped in various 
applications. They normally form centralized or decentralized structures, 
capable of handling entities involved in functions ranging from web and mail 
to sensor networks, file sharing to databases, and so on. Applications of such 
groups are enormous, and so are the demands for secure and reliable 
communication in these groups. 
Internet protocol (IP) multicast, also known as multicast, is used to share 
contents with multiple users in a group. This form of communication tends to 
be efficient in terms of bandwidth as compared to unicast protocols, as it 
transmits information to every user in the group simultaneously. Internet 
group management protocol (IGMP) [9] is an example of multicast systems, 
in which any member can broadcast data to all n  members in the group. Any 
user can join and receive contents in IGMP, which makes it a scalable system.  
Lack of access control and authentication poses security threats to IGMP, as 
any host can send and receive data from these systems. Conventional method 
to enforce restrictions on data flow is use of encryption to secure data contents, 
such that only the desired hosts can gather the data by utilizing cryptographic 
keys. Only the members with appropriate key can decrypt the data, which 
makes the communication secure and reliable. 
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Key distribution centre (KDC) or server is responsible for authentication of a 
user interested in joining the group. Server authenticates the user and allocates 
location to newly joined user. Server also provides the necessary keys to the 
user, which enables this user to communicate within the group.  
Key management protocols are responsible for key pre-distribution and key 
updating in case of changes in the group. Group keys are shared among all the 
members and the contents to be shared are encrypted with this key and 
broadcasted to all group members. Such groups are supposed to be flexible 
enough to allow new hosts to join and present members to leave. Joining and 
leaving of hosts require change in the group key, so that the privacy and 
secrecy of the group members and their communication can be preserved.  
Figure 1-1 shows structure of a secure centralized multicast system. 
 
 Figure 1-1 Secure centralized multicast system. 
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To maintain group keys, secure key management protocols are devised and 
employed. These protocols provide the authentication services, along with 
changing of the group keys with each user joining and leaving. The process of 
changing keys on every user join or leave is called key updating or rekeying. 
Lack of presence of any key management protocol has rekeying cost of nK
for n  users. Logical key hierarchy (LKH) [5] and one-way function key tree 
(OFT) [1] are two much efficient centralized key management schemes. These 
both schemes differ in their functionalities; OFT follows down-up strategy as 
opposed to LKH which follows a static key tree structure. LKH has broadcast 
costs of 2hk h  for n  users, where k is key size in bits and h is the height of 
tree. OFT scheme includes users along with the server in key updating process. 
This makes the scheme more efficient and it cuts the overhead cost at 
rekeying by 1/ 2 , i.e., hk h .   
1.2 Security Requirements 
Centralized key management schemes must, in all conditions, fulfill some 
security requirements.  Their basic security requirements are forward and 
backward secrecy in the group. Security requirements are discussed in detail 
in Chapter 2. 
Forward Secrecy: Evicted members of the group are unable to access new 
information in the group, which states they cannot compute (or access) newer 
group keys. 
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Backward Secrecy: New members of the group are unable to access previous 
information in the group, which states that they cannot compute older group 
keys.  
1.3 Objectives 
To fill the security gap caused by collusion attacks on OFT and to reduce 
comparatively higher cost of LKH scheme, several improvements in both of 
these key management schemes have been proposed in this thesis.  
OFT scheme is found to be weak against attacks by adversaries. We propose 
an improved OFT scheme, which guarantees better security at minimum costs.  
We also propose a simple LKH scheme for key distribution which provides 
the same functionalities at lower transmission cost.  
Our improvements guarantee less cost in both schemes.   
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2 Key Management Schemes 
This chapter describes two main centralized key management schemes in 
detail; logical key hierarchy and one-way function key tree. This chapter also 
covers collusion attacks on OFT scheme and revisited security requirements 
for key management schemes. 
2.1 Logical Key Hierarchy  
LKH maps all members of the group as leaves of a structured tree, most 
commonly as a balanced binary tree. Group key is at the root of the tree, 
whereas the leaves represent group members. Group members have to store 
their individual keys, group key, and all node keys in the path from member to 
the group key.  
Figure 2-1 shows a balanced binary LKH key tree with height 3.h   If the 
number of users in the group is n , then height of group is given as 2logh n . 
On each user leave or join, group key and other node keys in the path must be 
changed. New group key can be distributed by following the algorithms for 
join and leave functions, which will be defined in next subsections.  
The complexity for key distribution to n  users will be )(lognO .  
2.1.1 LKH Tree Structure 
All users in the group store 2log 1n   keys, out of which one is their 
individual key and all other h  keys belong to the middle nodes in its path to 
the group node key. These h  keys with the user need to be changed after each 
join or leave.  
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Figure 2-1 Logical key tree. 
2.1.2    On User Join 
Suppose user 8u  joins the group and users 1u  to 
7u are the present members. 
The group key k
 
and two node keys 78k  and 58k  are changed to 'k , 78' ,k
and 58' ,k  respectively.  
The key distribution process for each user join can be listed as: 
1. Server authenticates the interested user 8u  and allocates it an empty 
place in the group tree. Server also provides individual key 8k to the 
new user.  
2. All the keys which 8u  needs in order to communicate with group 
members, i.e.,
 
'k , 78' ,k  and 58'k  are sent by unicast to 
8u  encrypted 
with its individual key 8k . 
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3. 78'k  is shared by unicast to the sibling of new user 
8 ,u  7 ,u after 
encrypting with its individual key 7k . 
4. 58'k  is transmitted by multicast to 
7u  and 5 6( , )u u encrypted with 
78'k  and 56 ,k
 
respectively.  
5. New group key 'k is sent by multicast to 5 6 7( , , )u u u  and 
1 2 3 4( , , , )u u u u  
after being encrypted with 58'k  and 14 ,k respectively.   
 
2.1.3    On User Leave 
On eviction of user, middle node keys must be changed to preserve 
communication secrecy in the group.  
Suppose user 8u  leaves the group. Here, the group key 
k and node key 58k
 
must be changed. Their new values can be represented as 'k  and 57' ,k  
respectively. 
1. User 8u  node is deleted from the key tree at first. 
2. User  8u  sibling’s node, 
7 ,u moves to its parent’s node.  
3. 58k
 
and k are updated to new values, 'k  and 57' ,k  respectively.  
These new values are then sent to users 7 ,u 5 6( , ),u u and 
1 2 3 4( , , , )u u u u  by encrypting them with keys 7 ,k 56 ,k and 14 ,k
respectively.  
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2.2 One-Way Function Key Tree  
OFT key management scheme decreases server-level computation, as 
computation load is distributed between the server and group members. 
Rekeying overhead for OFT is hk h . 
Figure 2-2 shows OFT key management scheme, where ( , )f a b is a mixing 
function and (.)g  a one-way hash function. The value of (.)g  is called 
blinded node key.  
Details of these functions are as follows.  
• One-way function, ( )g  : The keys are passed through a strong one-
way function to hide the contents of the original key. These “blinded” 
keys can be shared to corresponding users without any security 
concerns.  
• Joining function, ( , )f a b : This function concatenates or combines 
two entities, a and .b  
 
 
Figure 2-2 OFT key tree of height h=3.  
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Members can calculate desired key ik  by following formula 
( ) ( )( ( ), ( ))i left i right ik f g k g k  
where ( )left ik and ( )right ik denote left and right children node keys of the node 
key ik .  
2.2.1    OFT Structure 
In OFT, keys are dependent on each other. Group members have knowledge 
of certain blinded node keys, which enables them to generate new keys on 
every user join and leave. All members know their sibling’s blinded node key 
as well as their ancestors’ sibling’s blinded node keys. For example, user 1u
also stores 2( )g k , 34( ),g k and 58( )g k along with its individual key 1.k  Now, 
members can compute their node keys and more importantly, the group key 
by using these known values. Left subgroup with users 1 2 3 4( , , , )u u u u  
performs the following operations to find their node keys as  
12 1 2
34 3 4
14 12 34
( ( ), ( ))
( ( ), ( ))
( ( ), ( )).
k f g k g k
k f g k g k
k f g k g k



 
Blinded subgroup node key 14k , which is left child node of group key, is 
shared with other subgroup. Users 5 6 7 8( , , , )u u u u  can compute key for right 
child node of group key, which is then shared with neighboring left subgroup 
as 
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56 5 6
78 7 8
58 56 78
( ( ), ( ))
( ( ), ( ))
( ( ), ( )).
k f g k g k
k f g k g k
k f g k g k



 
Group key k can be generated by all members of the group as 
14 58( ( ), ( )).k f g k g k  
Here, server as well as all group users participates to compute the group key.
 
2.2.2    On User Join 
Figure 2-2 shows the case of use joining, where a new user has just entered 
the group. When a user, say 8u , joins the group, he will receive his sibling’s 
blinded node key 7( )g k , and his ancestors’ sibling blinded node keys, 56( )g k
and 14( )g k . Server unicasts these keys to 
8u  after encrypting them with 
individual key of 8u , 8k . On the other hand, 
8u  calculates 78'k , 58' ,k and 'k  
by using the following formulae 
78 7 8
58 56 78
14 58
' ( ( ), ( ))
' ( ( ), ( ' ))
' ( ( ), ( ' )).
k f g k g k
k f g k g k
k f g k g k



 
The blinded values of the calculated keys are encrypted with their sibling keys 
and advertised to existing group members by multicast as follows: 
1 4
58 14
5 6
78 56
7
8 7
~ :{ ( ' )}
and :{ ( ' )}
:{ ( )}
multicast
u u g k k
server u u g k k
u g k k




  
where { ( )} ig k denotes the encryption of value ( )g  by key ik . 
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2.2.3    On User Leave 
On every user leave, group key must be changed to preserve forward and 
backward secrecy. The sibling of the evicted user is assigned with new key 
and it moves up to their parent’s node. The group key alters because of these 
steps.  
Suppose user 8u  leaves the group. Group key 
'k and node key 58'k
 
are 
computed by members of the group by using blinded node keys given as  
 
58 56 7
14 58
' ( ( ), ( ' ))
' ( ( ), ( ' )).
k f g k g k
k f g k g k


 
Updated right subgroup key 58'k
 
is shared with complementary left subgroup, 
whose members can calculate the new group key. 
By using this procedure, the need of multicasting all updated keys is reduced, 
as the users can compute necessary keys themselves. Only few blinded node 
keys are sent to particular users and subgroups. OFT reduces the required 
broadcasts to nearly half as compared to LKH scheme.  
2.3 Collusion Attacks on OFT 
2.3.1    Horng’s Attack 
Horng [6] shows that OFT scheme is susceptible to collusion attacks, where 
leaving and joining users can collude their information of group keys to find 
older or newer group keys as shown in Figure 2-3. This weakens the security 
notions of forward and backward secrecy. 
Here we present an example of such an attack on OFT. 
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Figure 2-3 User u
3
 is leaving the group and user u
5
 joins the group. 
 
Suppose the initial group key to be 0tk given as 
0 14 58( ( ), ( )).tk f g k g k  
In Figure 2-3, user 3u  leaves the group. This causes the group key to be 
changed. New group key 1tk will be 
 1 14 58( ( ' ), ( )).tk f g k g k  
If there is no other key updating operation and user 5u joins the group, then 
new group key 2tk will be  
2 14 58( ( ' ), ( ' )).tk f g k g k  
User 
3u  knows the value 58( )g k  and user 
5u  has knowledge of 14( ' )g k . Both 
users can collude their information to form 1tk  as 1 14 58( ( ' ), ( )).tk f g k g k  
OFT scheme is unsuccessful to provide forward secrecy against 
3u and 
backward secrecy against 
5.u  
13 
 
2.3.2   Ku and Chen’s Attack 
Ku and Chen [10] present some other cases of collusion attacks on OFT. We 
present these conditions here. 
 
 
Figure 2-4 User u
1
 leaves the group and users u
4   
and
   
u
5
 join the group. 
 
Consider Figure 2-4 for these attacks. Alice is represented by user u1 in the 
group; Bob is associated with user u4 in the key tree; Candy is related to user 
u
5. Also, time intervals follow the relation  t3 > t2 > t1. 
If Alice is evicted at state t1 and Bob is added to the same subgroup at time t2, 
they can collude to get the value of Gl subgroup key between time intervals t1 
and t2, as observed in Horng’s attack. As both members also know the blinded 
node key of subgroup Gr, they can easily compute group key between time 
intervals t1 and t2. Also, consider that Alice leaves the group at time t1. 
After this, Bob joins the group at time t2 , whereas Candy joins the group at 
time t3 at locations shown in Figure 2-4.  
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Alice and Bob are associated with Gl, whereas Candy belongs to Gr. Here, 
Alice knows the blinded node key of subgroup Gr between times t1 and t3. 
Candy knows the blinded node key of subgroup Gl between time t2 and t3. 
Alice and Candy can share their information about blinded node keys of 
subgroups to compute group key between time t2 and t3.  
In both of these cases, successful collusion attacks occur, which compromise 
the security of group communication. OFT scheme has security vulnerabilities, 
which must be addressed.  
2.4 Security Requirements 
Now we list some security requirements which must be fulfilled by all key 
management schemes in order to ensure secure communication in dynamic 
multicast systems. 
1. Group key secrecy: Any passive adversary is unable in any way 
to compute previous or existing group key.  This also implies that 
adversary is also unable to find any changed node key in the group. 
Mathematical operations and random numbers involved in rekeying 
must be cryptographically strong.  
 
2. Forward key secrecy: Passive adversaries or former members of 
the group, who may know any subset of older group keys, cannot 
find any new group key. 
 
3. Backward key secrecy: Passive adversaries or present members 
of the group, who may know any subset of group keys, are unable to 
discover any previously used group key. 
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4. Key independence: Passive adversaries or former and present 
members of the group, who may know any subset of group keys, are 
unable to discover any other group key. 
 
5. Reuse of known node keys: Evicted members must not discover 
any new information that is flowing within the group. Sometimes 
evicted users can use their prior knowledge of node keys to decrypt 
any future transmission. All node keys known to a leaving member 
must be changed during rekeying process. 
 
6. OFT group key segments: Group key in OFT scheme is 
combination of blinded node keys of its two children. These two 
children nodes represent left and right subgroup node keys. For each 
user leave, both segments of the group key must be changed. This 
step prevents occurring of any collusion attacks. 
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3 New Secure OFT Scheme  
 
In this chapter, improvement in the OFT schemes will be introduced, that is, 
OFT scheme is vulnerable to collusion attacks and thus this scheme needs 
extra steps to make it reliable enough for proper functionalities. 
We propose new OFT scheme with more security and lesser costs.  
3.1 Introduction 
In OFT scheme, all members are given the blinded node keys of their siblings 
and their ancestors’ siblings. They can then calculate the desired node and 
group keys by using these blinded node keys. In this way, a part of 
computation load is transferred to the users from the server. In OFT, rekeying 
overhead decreases as a result of combined computations by the server and 
members.  
 
First we define the levels and locations of the members in the group. Figure 
3-1 shows how we name each user based on their level and location within 
level in the group. This will help us in introducing the scheme which provides 
better key management performance along with ensuring better security 
against the collusion attacks. 
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Figure 3-1 Key tree with levels.  
 
In the above figure, 
• TEK: traffic encryption key (group key), used for communicating 
with all the users in the group (highest level node key) 
•  KEK: key encryption keys, also called as sub-group keys. They are 
used for encrypting the group key for its transfer (intermediate level 
node keys). 
•  IK: Individual keys of users (lowest level node keys) 
•  Height of tree (h): Number of levels in the tree. For example, the 
tree shown in Figure 3-1 has height of 3. 
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Figure 3-2 Key tree with location indices. 
 
We provide all the users with location indices which give information about 
their level and location in the group. Users must have 2log n  
blinded node 
keys, which are the blinded node keys of their siblings and their ancestors’ 
siblings, to communicate within group and update the keys whenever needed. 
These blinded node keys are kept with their indices, in the user’s memory as 
shown in Figure 3-2. This helps in maintaining and updating these keys 
whenever there is some change in the group. 
For example, the keys with the user 
1u can be written as shown in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1 The keys with user 
1u (0,1) 
Indices Key stored 
(0,2) 2( )g k  
(1,2) 34( )g k  
(2,2) 58( )g k  
 
Similarly, other users have the blinded node keys stored with the same 
pattern.  
Our scheme performs only at user eviction. On user join, it follows the 
scheme of original OFT. 
 
3.2 On User Leave 
In case of eviction, the sibling of the removed user takes the place of their 
parent. Also its sibling key changes, which causes change in the node key 
and the group key. Figure 3-2 shows eviction of 8u  after which 7u promotes 
to a higher level. Shaded nodes are the ones to be altered. 
3.2.1     Key Requirements 
Node keys are dependent in OFT scheme and users contribute in generation 
of node keys. Users have blinded node keys of their siblings and parent’s 
siblings, which are used to efficiently generate new keys without much 
intervention from server. Group members update the keys present with them 
and generate new node keys and the group key. New keys can be generated 
as explained in the following protocol. 
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3.2.2     Algorithm on User Eviction 
We present the algorithm which is followed by our scheme at user eviction. 
 
1. Server removes the node of evicted member from the key tree and 
promotes its sibling, if any, to higher level which was the level of 
its parent before eviction. 
2. Server provides new node key to evicted member’s sibling. It also 
shares the changed blinded node keys with appropriate neighboring 
members. 
3. All members of the affected subgroup can compute new subgroup 
node key. 
4. Server shares this new subgroup node key in blinded form with 
neighboring unaffected subgroup members. 
5. For the unaffected subgroup, server generates and shares a random 
number with its members. 
6. Members update stored node keys by XORing them with the 
provided random number, after which the resulting values are 
passed through one-way function to generate new node keys. 
7. All members of unaffected subgroup can calculate new subgroup 
node key by utilizing one-way and combining functions on blinded 
node key. 
8. This new subgroup node key is then shared with the neighboring 
(unaffected) subgroup. 
9. All members of the group can use blinded node keys of affected 
21 
 
and unaffected subgroup to calculate new group key. 
3.2.3    An Example of User Eviction 
User 8u leaves the subgroup with users 
5 6 7, ,u u u , and we define this 
subgroup as right, rG . The other subgroup is defined as left subgroup, lG .  
Group key is combination function of blinded node keys of subgroups rG
and lG . Our protocol changes both of these subgroup keys in order to 
prevent collusion attacks. 
1. After removal of 8u , 7k changes and this affects the node keys, 
which changes to 57'k and 'k . The new blinded node key 7( ' )g k is 
shared with the neighboring subgroup 5 6( , )u u  by encrypting with 
their node key 56k as 
u
5
 and u
6
7 56:{ ( ' )} .g k k  
2. Subgroup key 57'k can be formed by 
57 7 56' ( ( ' ), ( )).k f g k g k  
3. Right subgroup key is shared with the other subgroup as 
57 14:{ ( ' )} .sG g k k  
4. Level-2 blinded subgroup node key is transmitted to the left 
subgroup members, encrypted with their blinded subgroup node 
key as 
58 14:{ ( ' )} .sG g k k  
5. As for the left subgroup, server generates a random number ,nr
which is shared between all the present users of the subgroup as 
14:{ } .s nG r k  
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6. Users can change the blinded node keys with them, so as to alter 
the overall left blinded subgroup node keys. Already available 
blinded node keys can be changed like as shown in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2 Blinded node key change operations for user 
1u (0,1) 
Original blinded node keys New blinded node keys 
                1 2, ( )k g k  1 2, ( )k g k  
12( )g k  
34( )g k  
12 12( ' ) ( ( ) )ng k g g k r   
34 34( ' ) ( ( ) )ng k g g k r   
14( )g k  14 14( ' ) ( ( ) )ng k g g k r   
58( )g k  57( ' )g k  
 
 
7. New node key can be formed by all left subgroup users as shown in 
Table 3.2. 
14 14( ' ) ( ( ) )ng k g g k r   
8. This level-2 blinded subgroup node key is transmitted to the right 
subgroup members, encrypted with their blinded subgroup node 
key as 
14 58:{ ( ' )} ' .pG g k k  
9. New group key k  can be computed by all members of the group 
by using 
14 58( ( ' ), ( ' )).k f g k g k  
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3.3 Simulation and Results 
Results of our proposed scheme and the conventional key management 
schemes are shown in this section. 
Table 3.3 shows security properties of some of the known schemes, and 
shows that our proposed scheme has got better security strength. 
 
Table 3.3  Security of key management schemes 
 
Schemes 
Secrecy Secure against 
collusion attacks Forward Backward 
Simple Y Y Y 
GKMP [4] N Y Y 
LKH [9] Y Y Y 
OFT [7] N N N 
Ku and Chen [10] Y Y Y 
Xu et al. [11] Y Y Y 
Proposed sol. Y Y Y 
 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show performance of various schemes. They show that 
our scheme has less broadcast costs for user leave, as compared to scheme 
by Ku and Chen [10]. Our scheme performs even more efficiently than OFT 
for large group sizes. 
 
Table 3.4  Performance comparison of key management schemes 
 
Schemes 
Message 
Join Leave 
multicast unicast 
Simple nK  K  nK  
GKMP 2K  2K  -
 
LKH 
22log ( )n  2log ( )n  22log ( )n  
OFT 
2log ( )n  2
log ( )n
 2
log ( )n
 
Ku and Chen 
2log ( )n  2
log ( )n
 
2
2 2(log ( )) log ( )n n  
Proposed sol. 
2log ( )n  2
log ( )n
 
5  
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Table 3.5 Encryption costs for different schemes 
Schemes Join Leave 
LKH 23log ( )n  22log ( )n  
OFT 22log ( ) 2n   2log ( )n  
Ku and Chen 
22log ( ) 2n   
2
2 2(log ( )) log ( )n n  
Proposed sol. 
22log ( ) 2n   
5  
 
 
3.4 Security Analysis of Proposed Scheme 
Possibility of collusion attacks in OFT scheme arises because OFT keeps 
the blinded node keys known to the evicted members intact. Evicted 
members can then share blinded node keys available with them with other 
users in order to get the group key information which they are not intended 
to know. 
The proposed scheme, on the other hand, amends this vulnerability, that is, 
blinded subgroup node keys known to the evicted members are changed. In 
the proposed schemes, the former members are not able to reconstruct group 
keys by exercising any attacks explained in this paper. 
An example of a typical case of member eviction is given here. Alice evicts 
the subgroup lG , after which Bob and Candy join the subgroup lG  or rG . 
Alice knows the initial group key 
0( )
( ( ), ( ))
l rG s G G
k f g k g k . 
Group keys at eviction and joining for different cases are given below. 
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Case 1: 
Consider the case when both Bob and Candy join same subgroup,
rG .  
Then, we can write group key 
Gk  at different steps as follows. 
Step 1: Alice evicts 
lG  
1( )
( ( ), ( ))
l rG s G G
k f g k g k  . 
Step 2: Bob joins rG  
2( )
( ( ), ( ))
l rG s G G
k f g k g k  . 
Step 3: Candy joins 
rG  
3( )
( ( ), ( ))
l rG s G G
k f g k g k  . 
As obvious in this case, Alice is not able to collude with any present 
member in order to find illegitimate group keys. 
 
Case 2: 
Consider the case when Bob joins subgroup lG , whereas Candy joins the 
subgroup rG .  
Then, we can write group key Gk  at different steps as follows. 
Step 1: Alice evicts lG  
1( )
( ( ), ( ))
l rG s G G
k f g k g k  . 
Step 2: Bob joins lG  
2( )
( ( ), ( ))
l rG s G G
k f g k g k  . 
Step 3: Candy joins rG  
26 
 
3( )
( ( ), ( ))
l rG s G G
k f g k g k  . 
As seen in this case also, Alice is not able to collude with present members 
in order to find illegitimate group keys.  
Thus, the proposed scheme prevents any collusion attacks. 
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4 Multicast Scheme Based on LKH 
 
In this chapter, we will provide a new scheme based on LKH. Our proposed 
scheme is more efficient than the original LKH scheme in terms of 
communication overheads needed at rekeying. 
4.1 System Design 
4.1.1    Design Principles 
Firstly, we outline some basic principles, which our proposed scheme will 
comply. We use binary key tree, which tends to balance itself in order to 
maintain the symmetry.  Interested hosts can join the group through a process 
which includes sending request to the server and passing the authentication by 
the server. 
Server provides an empty place on the group to the new users. Server also 
provides the new member with all the necessary keys through the key 
management protocol. Similarly, present members can leave the group by 
sending request to the server, who in return eradicates the user and its 
corresponding node from the key tree. Sibling of the leaving node moves to 
the position of their parent node.  
4.1.2    Detailed Outline  
On each join or leave, keys in the path from that location to server need to be 
changed. This ensures the backward and forward secrecy requirements of 
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secure group communication. Server changes 2log n keys for each join, and 
2log 1n   keys for each user leave.  
The keys, which intend to be changed, affects 2l users, where l is the level of 
the key. This calls for an efficient protocol, capable of sharing new keys 
among all members of the group. 
Figure 4-1 shows a binary key tree with 3.l   On a user join, as shown in the 
figure, 2log n keys, namely, k , 58 ,k and 78k are affected. Change of 78k will 
affect two users 7u and 8u . Similarly, changing subgroup key 58k affects four 
users 5 8~u u .  
Each group member needs to change its group key k , on every user join and 
leave.   
 
 
 Figure 4-1 Binary key tree on a user join. 
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Our proposed scheme possesses the following distinctive features while 
distributing keys for right subgroup. 
 
• Our scheme follows bottom-to-top approach, where bottom node keys are 
firstly distributed to the desired members, moving upwards. 
• Higher level node keys are encrypted with lower level ones, and multicast 
to subsequent subgroups. For example, subgroup key at level-1 will be 
distributed by encrypting it with individual keys at level-0. After that, a 
subgroup key at level-2 is encrypted with level-1 key before multicast, 
and so on.     
• Instead of wasting resources by sending all keys to only one user, our 
proposed scheme moves in a step-wise manner thus providing all 
essential keys to members. 
4.2 On User Join 
After the interested host is successfully authenticated, server allocates the host 
an empty location in the group. Group key tree is renewed, according to 
following protocol. Example protocol for height 3h  is described below, 
which will be generalized afterwards. Figure 4-1 refers to the key tree for join 
case. 
8u joins the group, forming a subgroup with 7u . The shaded keys in the figure 
are changed to new ones by the server.  
   4.2.1    Key Requirements 
Depending on their location in the group, members require different keys to 
update the essential keys. Desired keys by user can be outlined as 
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1 8
5 6 7 8
58
~ : '
, , , : '
u u k
u u u u k
  
u
7
 and u
8
: 78' .k  
'k , 58' ,k and 78'k are new group key and subgroup keys, respectively. 
4.2.2    Protocol for User Join 
To share keys among the members of the group, they are encrypted by 
individual or subgroup keys and sent through unicast or multicast to 
respective members.   
{ } ijk k represents encryption of the group key k by any subgroup key ijk . The 
same notation is used in describing the schemes. 
The protocol for key management on user join is given below, where the keys 
are being transmitted by the server to various locations. 
1. Server encrypts new group key 'k  with subgroup key 14k and 
multicasts it to left subgroup as 
1 4
14~ :{ '} .u u k k  
2. For right subgroup, key distribution starts at the bottom where the 
bottom-most node key 78'k is encrypted with individual keys of both 
users 7u and 8u , before being unicast to them as 
7
78 7
8
78 8
:{ ' }
:{ ' } .
u k k
u k k
  
3. Level-2 node key 58'k is encrypted with level-1 node keys 56k and 
78'k , and shared as 
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5 6
58 56
7 8
58 78
 and  :{ ' }
 and  :{ ' } ' .
u u k k
u u k k
 
4. Right subgroup gets its new group key 'k  by encrypting and 
multicasting it as 
4 8
58~ :{ '} ' .u u k k  
4.3 On User Leave 
User leave makes an empty slot in the binary balanced key tree. Sibling of the 
leaving user gets promoted to the position of its parent’s node.  
Figure 4-2 shows user 8u leaving the tree, after which user 7u resides on 
level-1. Shaded nodes show the compromised keys that will be changed by 
the server. 
  
Figure 4-2 Binary key tree on a user leave. 
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4.3.1    Key Requirements 
For each user leave, server generates and shares 2log 1n keys to remaining 
members. The demand for keys differs with the member’s location. Keys 
needed for update can be outlined as 
1 7
5 6 7
57
~ : '
, , : '
u u k
u u u k
 
where 'k and 57'k are new group key and subgroup key, respectively. 
4.3.2    Protocol for User Leave 
Less number of keys is shared on each user leave, contrary to the number of 
keys distributed for each user join.   
The protocol for key management on each user leave is described below, 
where the keys are being transmitted by the server to various locations 
encrypted by either individual or subgroup keys. 
1. Server encrypts new group key 'k  with subgroup key 14k and 
multicasts it to left subgroup as  
1 4
14~ :{ '} .u u k k  
2. As for right subgroup, key distribution starts at the bottom. Level-2 
node key 57'k is encrypted with node key 56k and individual key of 
user 7u , 7k , before being multicast and unicast, respectively. 
5 6
57 56
7
57 7
 and :{ ' }
:{ ' }
u u k k
u k k
  
3. Right subgroup gets its new group key 'k  by encrypting and 
multicasting it as 
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4 7
57~ :{ '} ' .u u k k  
4.4 Simulation and Results 
Performance of our proposed scheme as compared to LKH scheme is shown 
in this section. 
4.4.1     Performance Comparison 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show performance of various schemes. They show that our 
scheme has less broadcast costs for user leave and join as compared to other 
key management schemes. Our scheme performs more efficiently than LKH 
and the communication overhead of our scheme is less than that of LKH. 
 
Table 4.1  Performance comparison of hierarchical schemes 
 
Schemes 
Message 
Join Leave 
Multicast  Unicast 
Simple nK  K  nK  
GKMP 2K  2K  -
 
LKH 
22log ( )n  2log ( )n  22log ( )n  
Our solution 
2log ( )n  2log ( ) 1n   2log ( ) 1n   
 
Encryption cost of our proposed scheme is also less than the original LKH 
scheme. 
 
Table 4.2 Encryption costs for different schemes 
Schemes Join Leave 
LKH 23log ( )n  22log ( )n  
Our solution 
22log ( )n  2
2log ( ) 2n 
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4.4.2     Empirical Analysis 
Following table shows broadcast costs at user join and leave for LKH and our 
scheme. The improvement in results can be analyzed from the table. 
Table 4.3 shows that our scheme has less broadcast costs for user join and 
leave, as compared to LKH. Thus, our scheme is more efficient than LKH in 
terms of costs. 
 
Table 4.3 Broadcast costs of schemes 
    Schemes 
Height 
LKH Our solution 
Join Leave Join Leave 
10 30 20 20 18 
12 36 24 24 22 
13 39 26 26 24 
14 42 28 28 26 
15 45 30 30 28 
16 48 32 32 30 
17 51 34 34 32 
18 54 36 36 34 
 
 
Table 4.4 compares our proposed scheme at user join and leave with original 
LKH scheme. It is clear that even for large groups, our proposed scheme gives 
better overhead costs. 
Table 4.4 Comparison of our solution 
Height 
Our sol./LKH 
10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Join 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Leave 0.9 0.917 0.923 0.928 0.933 0.9375 0.941 0.944 
 
Following Figures 4-3 and 4-4 show the performance comparison of our 
proposed scheme with LKH for different heights of key tree.  
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The following figures also show that our proposed scheme performs better 
with different number of users. 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Comparison between the proposed scheme and LKH on user join. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4 Comparison between the proposed scheme and LKH on user leave. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
Key management in dynamic groups, where users can leave or join at their 
ease is an important part of secure communication. Different strategies have 
been proposed during last decade that aim to either improve the security or the 
performance of key management schemes. Decreasing the encryption and 
transmission overheads has also been a major concern for such schemes.  
In this thesis, we proposed two schemes based on different architectures.  One 
of the schemes improves the security of OFT scheme. We showed the 
resilience of proposed scheme by analyzing different cases. The other 
proposed scheme improves the performance of independent key hierarchy 
system (LKH).  
Both proposed schemes provide better broadcast and transmission costs than 
previously published schemes.  
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